Copyright2015KRvWAssociates,LLCKenvanWyk,ken@krvw.
com,@KRvWPenTestingiOSAppsFIRST2015KenvanWyk,@KRvWBerlin,Germany14-19June2015Copyright2015KRvWAssociates,LLCTopicswe'llcoverWe'llfocusonhowtobreaktypicaliOSapps–iOStopics–ApplicationtopicsSimpleanalysis–Surfaceofapp–Staticanalysis–DynamicanalysisDeeperanalysis–Exploreappbinary–Run-timeexplorationandexploitation3Copyright2015KRvWAssociates,LLCToolsMosttoolswe'lluseareeitheropensourceorinexpensive–iExplorerforexploringfilesystemonaniOSdevice–iOSdeviceandaUSBcablePreferablyjailbrokenCydiaCycript4Copyright2015KRvWAssociates,LLCClearupsomemisconceptionsApple'siOShasbeenahugesuccessforApple–TogetherwithAndroid,theyhavere-definedmobiletelephonyApplehasmadegreatadvancesinsecurity–Theyarestillfarfromreallygood–Notevensureifthey'reprettygoodSoftwaredevelopersstillmakesillymistakes5Copyright2015KRvWAssociates,LLCSystemHardeningFeaturesAttacksurfacereductionStrippeddownOS–No/bin/shPrivilegeseparationCodesigningDataexecutionprevention(DEP)–Vitalforreturnorientedprogramming–NoarchitecturalseparationofdataandcodesegmentsAddressspacelayoutrandomization(ASLR)6Copyright2015KRvWAssociates,LLCApplicationsandboxingBypolicy,appsareonlypermittedtoaccessresourcesintheirsandbox–Inter-appcommsarebyestablishedAPIsonlyURLs,keychains(limited)–Filei/oin~/DocumentsonlyTheserulesdon'talwaysapplytoApple'sownapps7Copyright2015KRvWAssociates,LLCHardwareencryptionEachiOSdevice(asof3GS)hashardwarecryptomodule–UniqueAES-256keyforeveryiOSdevice–SensitivedatahardwareencryptedSoundsbrilliant,right–Well.
.
.
8Copyright2015KRvWAssociates,LLCiOScryptokeysGIDkey-GroupIDkeyUIDkey-UniqueperdevDkey-DefaultfilekeyEMF!
-EncryptsentirefilesystemandHFSjournalClasskeys-Oneperprotectionclass–SomederivedfromUID+Passcode9Copyright2015KRvWAssociates,LLCiOSNAND(SSD)mappingBlock0-LowlevelbootloaderBlock1-Effaceablestorage–Lockerforcryptokeys,includingDkeyandEMF!
Blocks2-7-NVRAMparametersBlocks8-15-FirmwareBlocks8-(N-15)-FilesystemBlocks(N-15)-N-Last15blocksreservedbyApple10Copyright2015KRvWAssociates,LLCBuilt-infileprotectionclassesiOS(since4)supportsfileprotectionclasses–NSFileProtectionComplete–NSFileProtectionCompleteUnlessOpen–NSFileProtectionCompleteUntilFirstUserAuthentication–NSFileProtectionNoneAllbutNonearederived11Copyright2015KRvWAssociates,LLCBuilt-infileprotectionlimitationsPros–Easytouse,withkeymanagementdonebyiOS–Powerfulfunctionality–Alwaysavailable–ZeroperformancehitCons–ForComplete,cryptokeyingincludesUDID+Passcode4digitPINproblem12Copyright2015KRvWAssociates,LLCKeychainsKeychainAPIprovidedforstorageofsmallamountsofsensitivedata–Logincredentials,passwords,etc.
–CreditcarddataoftenfoundhereStoredinaSQLitedatabase–EncryptedusinghardwareAESwithderivedkey13Copyright2015KRvWAssociates,LLCJailbreaksApple'sprotectionarchitectureisbasedonamassivedigitalsignaturehierarchy–Startingfrombootloader–ThroughapploaderJailbreaksoftwarebreaksthathierarchy–Currentbreaksupto8.
1.
2DFUmodeallowsUSBvectorforbootloader–OlderiPhonesmostly,but…14Copyright2015KRvWAssociates,LLCKeyboarddataAll"keystrokes"arestored–Usedforauto-correctfeature–NicespellcheckerKeydatacanbeharvestedusingforensicsprocedures–Passwords,creditcards.
.
.
–Needleinhaystack15Copyright2015KRvWAssociates,LLCScreensnapshotsDevicesroutinelygrabscreensnapshotsandstoreinJPG–Usedforminimizingappanimation–ItlooksprettyWHAT!
–It'saproblem–Requireslocalaccesstodevice,butstill.
.
.
16Copyright2015KRvWAssociates,LLCLet'sconsiderthebasicsWe'llcoverthese(fromthemobiletop10)–ProtectingsecretsAtrestIntransit–Input/outputvalidation–Authentication–Sessionmanagement–Accesscontrol–Privacyconcerns17Copyright2015KRvWAssociates,LLCExamplesAirlineapp–StoresfrequentflyerdatainplaintextXMLfileHealthcareapp–StorespatientdatainplistfileButit'sbase64encodedforyourprotection…Bankingapp–FrameworkcacherevealedsensitiveaccountdataConsumerticketapp–AcceptedSSLfromselfsignedkey–Exposedcreditcarddata18Copyright2015KRvWAssociates,LLCSQLliteexampleLet'slookatadatabaseappthatstoressensitivedataintoaSQLitedb–We'llrecoverittriviallybylookingattheunencrypteddatabasefile19Copyright2015KRvWAssociates,LLCProtectingsecretsatrestEncryptionistheanswer,butit'snotquitesosimple–Wheredidyouputthatkey–Surelyyoudidn'thardcodeitintoyourapp–Surelyyou'renotcountingontheusertogenerateandrememberastrongkeyKeymanagementisanon-triviallysolvedproblem20Copyright2015KRvWAssociates,LLCStaticanalysisofanappExplorefolders–.
/Documents–.
/Library/Caches/*–.
/Library/Cookies–.
/Library/PreferencesAppbundle–Hexdumpofbinary–plistfilesWhatelse21Copyright2015KRvWAssociates,LLCToolstouseMactools–Finder–iExplorer–hexdump–strings–otool–otx(otx.
osxninja.
com)–class-dump(iphone.
freecoder.
org/classdump_en.
html)–Emacs(editor)Xcodeadditionaltools–Clang(buildandanalyze)Findsmemoryleaksandothers22Copyright2015KRvWAssociates,LLCExercise-coffeeshopattackThisoneistrivial,butlet'stakealookInthisiGoatexercise,theuser'scredentialsaresentplaintext–SimplewebserverrunningonMacresponds–IfthiswereonapublicWiFi,anetworksnifferwouldbepainlesstolaunch23Copyright2015KRvWAssociates,LLCMostcommonSSLmistakeWe'veallheardofCAsbeingattacked–That'sallimportant,but.
.
.
–(Certificatepinningcanhelp.
)FailingtoproperlyverifyCAsignaturechain–BiggestSSLproblembyfar–Studyshowed1/3ofAndroidappsfelltothis24Copyright2015KRvWAssociates,LLCTestingforSSLproblemsGoalistoensureclientperformsstrongcertificateverificationMITMonthenetsetup–Appproxyonlaptop(e.
g.
,Burpsuite)–GenerateSSLcertsignedbyyourownCA–PutyourCAcertontestiOSdeviceRemembertoremovefakeCAbeforeleavinglabenvironment!
25Copyright2015KRvWAssociates,LLCButthat'snotenough26Copyright2015KRvWAssociates,LLCObjCRun-timeisflawedUnlikeinC,"functions"arenotcalled–Messagesarepassed–ObjectsdynamicallyallocatedWithinprocessspace,dynamictamperingalsopossible–Messagetraffic–Objects27Copyright2015KRvWAssociates,LLCReverseengineeringAttackerwantstolearnhowyourappworks–DeepinternaldetailsAttackerwantstoattempttotrickyourappintomisbehaving–TamperwithruntimeHowJailbrokendeviceandsomefreetools–Andalotoftime28Copyright2015KRvWAssociates,LLCPrerequisitetoolsandenvMacwithOSXandXcodeJailbrokendevice–evasi0nworksgreatCydiaandfriends–Cydiainstalledwithevasi0n–ShellaccessOpenSSH-installwithCydia–Debuggergdb-installwithCydiaBareminimumessentials29Copyright2015KRvWAssociates,LLCAnalysistechniquesStaticanalysis–Observeattributesoftheexecutable,appfiles–Yes,encrypted(appstore)appstooDynamicanalysis–RuntheappandlearnhowitworksTampering–Tricktherun-timeenv30Copyright2015KRvWAssociates,LLCStaticanalysisAnybinarycanbeexamined–Usuallyrevealamaptoclasses,objects,text,symbols,etc.
Commontools–otool–class-dump-z–nmExamples–Linkedlibs,methodsotool-Lappnameotool-lappname–Listofclassesclass-dump-zappname–Symboltablenmappname31Copyright2015KRvWAssociates,LLCIt'sCunderneaththehoodBeneaththatniceOOPObjClayerliesaCfoundation–PrettymucheverythinginObjCcanbedoneinCPrimitivesfordoingalltheOOstuffobjc_msgSend(),objc_getClass()areprimeexamplesThismatterstouswhenanalyzingstaticallyordynamically32Copyright2015KRvWAssociates,LLCEncryptedbinariestooBasicprocess–Useapploadertodecrypt–Calculatememoryoffsets–StoreprocesstodiskddisyourfriendWillalsoneedplutilandgdbHOWTOavailable–http://www.
mandalorian.
com/2013/05/decrypting-ios-binaries/33Copyright2015KRvWAssociates,LLCLet'stakealook34Copyright2015KRvWAssociates,LLCDynamicanalysisWhatcanwelearnfromobservingitrunning–Alot–Allthosemessages–Memorycontents–CPUregistersYoudon'thaveanythingtohide,right35Copyright2015KRvWAssociates,LLCAttackingarunningappManintheapp(MITA)–Themostdangerousformofon-hostdynamicattack–InternalaccesstoeverythingThatObjCrun-timemessagingarchitectureisgoingtohauntus36Copyright2015KRvWAssociates,LLCAfewmoretoolsForthese,you'llwant–gdb–Cycript(seeslide)–Networkproxy(e.
g.
,Burpsuite)–SSLstrip(optional)37Copyright2015KRvWAssociates,LLCMessageeavesdroppingUsegdbtobuildasimplebuteffectivemessageeavesdropper–Examplegdb-q-pPIDbreakobj_msgSendcommandsx/a$r0x/s$r1c38Copyright2015KRvWAssociates,LLCCycript"CycriptallowsdeveloperstoexploreandmodifyrunningapplicationsoneitheriOSorMacOSXusingahybridofObjective-C++andJavaScriptsyntaxthroughaninteractiveconsolethatfeaturessyntaxhighlightingandtabcompletion"—Fromhttp://www.
cycript.
orgItisanamazingutilityfordynamicallyprobingarunningapp39Copyright2015KRvWAssociates,LLCFunwithCycriptBasics#cycriptcy#varmyString=[[NSStringalloc]cy>initWithString:@"Helloworld"];"Helloworld"cy#[myStringlength];11CombinationofJavaScriptandObjCsyntaxgivesamazingcapabilities40Copyright2015KRvWAssociates,LLCCycript(2)Safariexample#cycript-pPIDcy#varapp=[UIApplicationsharedApplication];""cy#[appopenURL:[NSURLURLWithString:cy>@"http://www.
first.
org"]];1cy#app.
networkActivityIndicatorVisible=YES41Copyright2015KRvWAssociates,LLCCycriptingforfunandprofitBreakclient-sidelogic–AlterPINs,booleans,semaphores–ReplacemethodsProberunningappdata–Canbeverbose,butyougeteverythinginanobjectcy#functionappls(a){varx={};for(iin*a){try{x[i]=(*a)[i];}catch(e){}}returnx;}cy#appls(object);42Copyright2015KRvWAssociates,LLCClient-sidelogicYoudidn'tthinkyoucouldtrustclient-sidelogic,didyou43Copyright2015KRvWAssociates,LLCTamperingNowlet'sgobeyondmereobservationReplaceexistingmethods–Changeaddressingdb–DynamiclinkerattackPutyourlibraryinDYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIESAutomatedynamiclinking–MobileSubstrate44Copyright2015KRvWAssociates,LLCNothingiswhatitappearsNowwecanchangetheentireuniverseyourapprunsin(Ifthisdoesn'tseembad,gowatchTheMatrix)45Copyright2015KRvWAssociates,LLCCopyright2013KRvWAssociates,LLCResourcesHackingandSecuringiOSApplications,JonathanZdziarski,O'Reilly,2012Evasi0n,popularjailbreakingtool,http://www.
evad3rs.
com/46Copyright2015KRvWAssociates,LLCHardeningUseractionsandclientconfigurationsArchitecturalconsiderationsHardeningtipsButremember,nothingisperfect.
47Copyright2015KRvWAssociates,LLCUseractionsandconfigurationsStrongpasscodeshelpMDMscanmanageconfigurationsofentirefleets48Copyright2015KRvWAssociates,LLCArchitecturalconsiderationsDesignchoicesmakeahugedifference–ClientcannotbetrustedSensitivedataSensitivefunctionsSecuritycontrols–ClientshouldprovidepresentationlayerMinimalfunctionalityProcessingshouldbeserver49Copyright2015KRvWAssociates,LLCHardeningtipsNon-obviousnames–ObfuscatefunctionalpurposeDisabledebugging#defineDENY_DEBUG31ptrace(DENY_DEBUG,0,0,0);Complicatedisassembly–Compileroptimizer–Stripsymbols50Copyright2015KRvWAssociates,LLCHardeningtips(2)Sensitivecode–Onserver,but…–WriteinCorASM–Compile+linkin-line–ExpandloopsmanuallyForceyourattackertosinglestepthroughDon'tgiveawayanything51Copyright2015KRvWAssociates,LLCHardening(3)Datastorage–EncryptDataProtectionAPIforconsumergradeKeysonserver–CommonCryptoLibSecurefilewipingSQLitedatawiping–Updatebeforedelete52Copyright2015KRvWAssociates,LLCTamperdetectionHowdoweknow–Run-timeintegritychecksMemoryoffsetsofsensitiveobjects–SandboxintegrityAttempttoforkSizeandchecksumof/etc/fstabSymboliclinksin/ApplicationsCommonjailbreakfilesandapps–/Applications/Cydia.
app–HoneypotsinappThereain'tahorsethatcan'tberodeoramanthatcan'tbethrowed.
53Copyright2015KRvWAssociates,LLCTamperresponseWhattodo–Remotewipe–Phonehome–Logeverything–Wipeuserdata,keys–Disablenetworkaccess–Etcetera54Copyright2015KRvWAssociates,LLCCopyright2014KRvWAssociates,LLCCopyright2015KRvWAssociates,LLCKennethR.
vanWykKRvWAssociates,LLCKen@KRvW.
comhttp://www.
KRvW.
com@KRvW55
中秋节快到了,spinservers针对中国用户准备了几款圣何塞机房特别独立服务器,大家知道这家服务器都是高配,这次推出的机器除了配置高以外,默认1Gbps不限制流量,解除了常规机器10TB/月的流量限制,价格每月179美元起,机器自动化上架,一般30分钟内,有基本自助管理功能,带IPMI,支持安装Windows或者Linux操作系统。配置一 $179/月CPU:Dual Intel Xeon E...
搬瓦工和Vultr哪个好?搬瓦工和Vultr都是非常火爆的国外VPS,可以说是国内网友买的最多的两家,那么搬瓦工和Vultr哪个好?如果要选择VPS,首先我们要考虑成本、服务器质量以及产品的售后服务。老玩家都知道目前在国内最受欢迎的国外VPS服务商vultr和搬瓦工口碑都很不错。搬瓦工和Vultr哪个稳定?搬瓦工和Vultr哪个速度快?为了回答这些问题,本文从线路、速度、功能、售后等多方面对比这两...
LOCVPS发来了新的洛杉矶CN2线路主机上线通知,基于KVM架构,目前可与香港云地、香港邦联机房XEN架构主机一起适用7折优惠码,优惠后最低美国洛杉矶CN2线路KVM架构2GB内存套餐月付38.5元起。LOCPVS是一家成立较早的国人VPS服务商,目前提供洛杉矶MC、洛杉矶C3、和香港邦联、香港沙田电信、香港大埔、日本东京、日本大阪、新加坡、德国和荷兰等机房VPS主机,基于KVM或者XEN架构。...
ios6.1.3越狱为你推荐
atmosphereios11包过滤防火墙和灵巧网关设置regularitygraphdevelopedandroid支持ipad支持ipad模块iphoneeacceleratoraccess violation问题的解决办法!ipad如何上网IPAD4怎样上网?x-routerX-TRAlL是什么意思
3322免费域名 bluehost omnis godaddy续费优惠码 godaddy优惠券 eq2 777te anylink hkg 免费网络空间 江苏徐州移动 买空间网 江苏双线 黑科云 杭州电信 .htaccess 傲盾代理 easypanel blaze 免费网络电视软件 更多