unnecessaryregister.com

StateandLocal"Sanctuary"PoliciesLimitingParticipationinImmigrationEnforcementMichaelJohnGarciaLegislativeAttorneyKateM.
ManuelLegislativeAttorneyJuly10,2015CongressionalResearchService7-5700www.
crs.
govR43457StateandLocal"Sanctuary"PoliciesLimitingParticipationinImmigrationEnforcementCongressionalResearchServiceSummaryWhilethepowertoprescriberulesastowhichaliensmayentertheUnitedStatesandwhichaliensmayberemovedresidessolelywiththefederalgovernment,theimpactofalienmigration—whetherlawfulorunlawful—isarguablyfeltmostdirectlyinthecommunitieswherealienssettle.
Stateandlocalresponsestounlawfullypresentalienswithintheirjurisdictionshavevariedconsiderably,particularlyastotherolethatstateandlocalpoliceshouldplayinenforcingfederalimmigrationlaw.
Somestates,cities,andothermunicipalitieshavesoughttoplayanactiveroleinimmigrationenforcementefforts.
However,othershavebeenunwillingtoassistthefederalgovernmentinenforcingmeasuresthatdistinguishbetweenresidentswithlegalimmigrationstatusandthosewholackauthorizationunderfederallawtobepresentintheUnitedStates.
Insomecircumstances,thesejurisdictionshaveactivelyopposedfederalimmigrationauthorities'effortstoidentityandremovecertainunlawfullypresentalienswithintheirjurisdictions.
Althoughstateandlocalrestrictionsoncooperationwithfederalimmigrationenforcementeffortshaveexistedfordecades,therehasreportedlybeenanupswingintheadoptionofthesemeasuresinrecentyears.
Moreover,thenatureoftheserestrictionshasevolvedovertime,particularlyinresponsetorecentfederalimmigrationenforcementinitiativeslikeSecureCommunities(subsequentlyreplacedbythePriorityEnforcementProgram),whichenablefederalauthoritiestomoreeasilyidentifyremovablealiensinstateorlocalcustody.
Entitiesthathaveadoptedsuchpoliciesaresometimesreferredtoas"sanctuary"jurisdictions,thoughthereisnotnecessarilyaconsensusastothemeaningofthistermoritsapplicationtoaparticularstateorlocality.
Recentreportsthatanalienwhoshotandkilledawoman,afterbeingreleasedbySanFranciscoauthoritieswhohaddeclinedtohonoranimmigrationdetainerissuedbyfederalauthorities,havebroughtincreasedattentiontostateandlocalpracticesofdecliningtohonorsuchdetainers,aswellas"sanctuary"policiesmoregenerally.
Thisreportdiscusseslegalissuesrelatedtostateandlocalmeasuresthatlimitlawenforcementcooperationwithfederalimmigrationauthorities.
Thereportbeginsbyprovidingabriefoverviewoftheconstitutionalprinciplesinformingtherelationshipbetweenfederalimmigrationauthoritiesandstateandlocaljurisdictions,includingthefederalgovernment'spowertopreemptstateandlocalactivitiesundertheSupremacyClause,andtheTenthAmendment'sproscriptionagainstCongressdirectly"commandeering"thestatestoadministerafederallyenactedregulatoryscheme.
Thereportthendiscussesvarioustypesofmeasuresadoptedorconsideredbystatesandlocalitiestolimittheirparticipationinfederalimmigrationenforcementefforts,including(1)limitingpoliceinvestigationsintotheimmigrationstatusofpersonswithwhomtheycomeincontact;(2)decliningtohonorfederalimmigrationauthorities'requeststhatcertainaliensbehelduntilthoseauthoritiesmayassumecustody;(3)shieldingcertainunlawfullypresentaliensfromdetectionbyfederalimmigrationauthorities;and(4)amendingorapplyingstatecriminallawssoastoreduceoreliminatetheimmigrationconsequencesthatmightresultfromanalien'scriminalconviction.
Fordiscussionoflegalissuesraisedbystatesandlocalitiesseekingtoplayanactiveroleinenforcingfederalimmigrationlaw,seeCRSReportR41423,AuthorityofStateandLocalPolicetoEnforceFederalImmigrationLaw,byMichaelJohnGarciaandKateM.
Manuel.
StateandLocal"Sanctuary"PoliciesLimitingParticipationinImmigrationEnforcementCongressionalResearchServiceContentsIntroduction.
1LegalBackground.
2SelectStateandLocalLimitationsonImmigrationEnforcementActivity.
7Traditional"Sanctuary"Policies7LimitingArrestsforFederalImmigrationViolations.
8LimitingInformation-SharingwithFederalImmigrationAuthorities9LimitingPoliceInquiriesintoPersons'ImmigrationStatus12DecliningtoHonorImmigrationDetainers.
13ShieldingUnlawfullyPresentJuvenilesfromFederalDetection.
17ModifyingCriminalSentencestoAvoidImmigrationConsequences.
19ContactsAuthorContactInformation.
20StateandLocal"Sanctuary"PoliciesLimitingParticipationinImmigrationEnforcementCongressionalResearchService1IntroductionWhilethepowertoprescriberulesastowhichaliensmayentertheUnitedStatesandwhichaliensmayberemovedresidessolelywiththefederalgovernment,1theimpactofalienmigration—whetherlawfulorunlawful—isarguablyfeltmostdirectlyinthecommunitieswherealienssettle.
Stateandlocalresponsestounlawfullypresentalienswithintheirjurisdictionshavevariedconsiderably,particularlyastotherolethatstateandlocalpoliceshouldplayinenforcingfederalimmigrationlaw.
Atoneendofthespectrum,somestatesandlocalitieshaveactivelysoughttodeterunlawfullypresentaliensfromsettlingwithintheirjurisdictions,includingbyassistingfederalimmigrationauthoritiesinidentifyingandapprehendingsuchaliensforpurposesofremoval.
Insomecases,thishasinvolvedstateandlocalparticipationinfederallycoordinatedimmigrationenforcementprograms.
2Inrecentyears,somestatesandlocalitieshaveattemptedtoplayanevengreaterroleintheareaofimmigrationenforcement,inmanycasesduetoperceptionsthatfederaleffortshavebeeninadequate.
Somehaveadoptedmeasuresthatcriminallysanctionconductbelievedtofacilitatethepresenceofunlawfullypresentaliens,andhavealsoinstructedpolicetoactivelyworktodetectsuchaliensaspartoftheirregularduties.
Theadoptionofsuchmeasureshaswanedconsiderably,however,intheaftermathofthe2012SupremeCourtrulinginArizonav.
UnitedStates,wheretheCourtheldthatmanyoftheprovisionsofonesuchenactment,Arizona'sS.
B.
1070,werefaciallypreemptedbyfederalimmigrationlaw.
3Attheotherendofthespectrum,somestatesandlocalitieshavebeenunwillingtoassistthefederalgovernment'senforcementofmeasuresthatdistinguishbetweenthoseresidentswithlegalimmigrationstatusandthosewholackauthorizationunderfederallawtobepresentintheUnitedStates.
Insomeinstances,thesejurisdictionshaveadoptedmeasuresthatseektothwartfederaleffortstoidentifyandapprehendunlawfullypresentalienswithinthestateorlocality'sjurisdiction.
1See,e.
g.
,Arizonav.
UnitedStates,132S.
Ct.
2492,2497(2012)("TheGovernmentoftheUnitedStateshasbroad,undoubtedpoweroverthesubjectofimmigrationandthestatusofaliens.
");DeCanasv.
Bica,424U.
S.
351,354(1976)("Powertoregulateimmigrationisunquestionablyexclusivelyafederalpower.
");Kleindienstv.
Mandel,408U.
S.
753,767(1972)(Congresshas"plenarypowertomakerulesfortheadmissionofaliensandtoexcludethosewhopossessthosecharacteristicswhichCongresshasforbidden")(internalcitationsomitted);Takahashiv.
FishandGameCommission,334U.
S.
410,416(1948)("Theauthoritytocontrolimmigration—toadmitorexcludealiens—isvestedsolelyintheFederalgovernment.
");OceanicNavigationCo.
v.
Stranahan,214U.
S.
320,339(1909)("overnoconceivablesubjectisthelegislativepowerofCongressmorecompletethanitisover"theadmissionofaliensintotheUnitedStates).
2Perhapsmostnotably,under§287(g)oftheImmigrationandNationalityAct(INA),theDepartmentofHomelandSecurity(DHS)isauthorizedtoenterwrittenagreementswithstateandlocaljurisdictionsthatenablespeciallytrainedstateorlocalofficerstoperformspecificfunctionsrelativetotheinvestigation,apprehension,ordetentionofaliens,duringapredeterminedtimeframeandunderfederalsupervision.
8U.
S.
C.
§1357(g).
Forfurtherdiscussionofstateandlocalparticipationinthefederalgovernment'simmigrationenforcementefforts,seeCRSReportR41423,AuthorityofStateandLocalPolicetoEnforceFederalImmigrationLaw,byMichaelJohnGarciaandKateM.
Manuel,andCRSReportR42057,InteriorImmigrationEnforcement:ProgramsTargetingCriminalAliens,byMarcR.
RosenblumandWilliamA.
Kandel.
3Arizonav.
UnitedStates,132S.
Ct.
2492(2012).
SeealsoCRSReportR42719,Arizonav.
UnitedStates:ALimitedRoleforStatesinImmigrationEnforcement,byKateM.
ManuelandMichaelJohnGarcia,andCRSLegalSidebarWSLG96,Arizonav.
UnitedStates:SomeImmediateTakeaways,byMichaelJohnGarcia.
StateandLocal"Sanctuary"PoliciesLimitingParticipationinImmigrationEnforcementCongressionalResearchService2Whilestateandlocalrestrictionsoncooperationinfederalimmigrationenforcementeffortshaveexistedfordecades,therehasbeenanupswingintheadoptionofthesemeasuresinrecentyears.
4Moreover,thenatureoftheserestrictionshasevolvedovertime,particularlyinresponsetorecentfederalimmigrationenforcementinitiativeslikeSecureCommunities(subsequentlyreplacedbythePriorityEnforcementProgram(PEP),asdiscussedbelow),whichenablefederalauthoritiestomoreeasilyidentifypotentiallyremovablealiensinstateorlocalcustody.
Thisreportdiscusseslegalissuesrelatedtostateandlocalmeasureslimitinglawenforcementcooperationwithfederalimmigrationauthorities.
Itbeginsbyprovidingabriefoverviewofconstitutionalprinciplesinformingtherelationshipbetweenfederalimmigrationauthoritiesandstateandlocaljurisdictions.
Thereportthendiscussesvarioustypesofmeasuresadoptedorconsideredbystatesandlocalitiestolimittheirparticipationwithfederalimmigrationenforcementefforts,including(1)limitingpoliceinvestigationsintotheimmigrationstatusofpersonswithwhomtheycomeincontact;(2)decliningtohonorfederalimmigrationauthorities'requeststhatcertainaliensbehelduntilthoseauthoritiesmayassumecustody;(3)shieldingcertainunlawfullypresentaliensfromdetectionbyfederalimmigrationauthorities;and(4)amendingorapplyingstatecriminallawssoastoreduceoreliminatetheimmigrationconsequencesthatmightresultfromanalien'scriminalconviction.
LegalBackgroundPursuanttoits"broad,undoubtedpoweroverthesubjectofimmigrationandthestatusofaliens,"5thefederalgovernmenthasestablishedan"extensiveandcomplex"setofrulesgoverningtheadmissionandremovalofaliens,alongwithconditionsforaliens'continuedpresencewithintheUnitedStates.
6TheserulesareprimarilycontainedintheImmigrationandNationalityActof1952,asamended(INA).
7TheINAsupplementstheserulesthroughanenforcementregimethatcontainscriminalandcivilprovisions,whichsometimessanctionsimilar4SeeNationalCouncilofStateLegislatures,2014ImmigrationReport(Jan.
2015),availableathttp://www.
ncsl.
org/research/immigration/2014-immigration-report.
aspx(hereinafter"NCSLImmigrationReport");NationalImmigrationLawCenter,InclusivePoliciesAdvanceDramaticallyintheStates(Oct.
2013),availableathttp://www.
nilc.
org/document.
htmlid=963;FederationforAmericanImmigrationReform,SanctuaryPoliciesAcrosstheU.
S.
(Oct.
2013)(identifyingandprovidinglinkstovariousstateandlocalenactmentsandpoliciesrestrictinginvolvementinimmigrationenforcementactivity),availableathttp://www.
fairus.
org/DocServer/amnesty_2013_debate/Sanctuary_Policies_Across_the_US_110513.
pdf(hereinafter"FAIRCompilationofStateandLocalRestrictions").
SeealsoCenterforImmigrationStudies,Map:SanctuaryCities,CountiesandState(July2015)(interactivemapidentifyingstates,counties,andmunicipalitiesthatlimitthehonoringofimmigrationdetainerrequests)(hereinafter"CISMapofJurisdictionswhichRestricttheHonoringofImmigrationDetainers").
5Arizona,132S.
Ct.
at2497.
Seealsosuprafootnote1(citingseveralSupremeCourtcasesrecognizingexclusivefederalpoweroverimmigration).
Federalauthorityoverimmigrationderivesfrommultiplesources.
TheConstitutionprovidesCongresswiththeauthority"[t]oregulateCommercewithforeignNations,"and"[t]oestablishanuniformRuleofNaturalization.
"U.
S.
CONST.
,Art.
I,§8,cl.
3-4.
Federalauthoritytoregulatetheadmissionandpresenceofaliensalsoderivesfromitsauthorityoverforeignaffairs.
SeeTollv.
Moreno,458U.
S.
1,10(1982)(discussingvariousconstitutionalprovisions,aswellasauthorityoverforeignaffairs,whichmayserveasasourceforimmigrationregulationbythefederalgovernment);Arizona,132S.
Ct.
at2498(2012)(similar,andalsostatingthat"[i]mmigrationpolicycanaffecttrade,investment,tourism,anddiplomaticrelationsfortheentireNation,aswellastheperceptionsandexpectationsofaliensinthiscountrywhoseekthefullprotectionofitslaws");Kleindienst,408U.
S.
at767(discussingCongress'splenaryauthoritytomakerulesforadmissionofaliens).
6Arizona,132S.
Ct.
at2497.
78U.
S.
C.
§§1101,etseq.
StateandLocal"Sanctuary"PoliciesLimitingParticipationinImmigrationEnforcementCongressionalResearchService3conduct.
8ThecourtshaveconsistentlyrecognizedthattheremovalofaliensfromtheUnitedStatesforviolatingthetermsoftheiradmissionorcontinuedpresenceinthecountryisacivilaction,ratherthanacriminalsanction,becausethemainpurposeisnottopunishwrongdoingbuttoendacontinuingviolationofthenation'simmigrationlaws.
9Whilethefederalgovernment'sauthorityoverimmigrationiswellestablished,theSupremeCourthasrecognizedthatnot"everystateenactmentwhichinanywaydealswithaliensisaregulationofimmigrationandthuspersepreempted"bythefederalgovernment'sexclusivepoweroverimmigration.
10TheTenthAmendmentprovidesthatpowers"notdelegatedtotheUnitedStatesbytheConstitution,norprohibitedbyittothestates,arereservedtothestatesrespectively,ortothepeople.
"11Amongthepowersreservedtothestatesaretraditional"policepowers"concerningthepromotionandregulationofsafety,health,welfare,andeconomicactivitywithinthestate'sjurisdiction.
12Pursuanttotheexerciseofthesepowers,statesandmunicipalitieshavefrequentlyenactedmeasureswhich,directlyorindirectly,addressaliensresidingintheircommunities.
13Theexerciseofstatepolicepowersmaybecircumscribedbylawfulassertionsoffederalauthority.
TheSupremacyClauseoftheConstitutionestablishesthatfederallaw,treaties,andtheConstitutionitselfare"thesupremeLawoftheLand.
"14Accordingly,statesandlocalitiesmaybeprecludedfromtakingactionsthatare"preempted"byfederallaw,evenifsuchactionsareotherwisevalidexercisesoftheirpolicepowers.
15AnactofCongressmaypreemptstateorlocal8Forabriefdiscussionofimmigration-relatedcrimes,seeCRSLegalSidebarWSLG563,AnOverviewofImmigration-RelatedCrimes,byMichaelJohnGarcia.
9Padillav.
Kentucky,559U.
S.
356,365(2010)("Wehavelongrecognizedthatdeportationisaparticularlysevere'penalty,'butitisnot,inastrictsense,acriminalsanction.
")(internalquotationsandcitationsomitted);INSv.
Lopez-Mendoza,468U.
S.
1032,1038-39(1984)("Adeportationproceedingisapurelycivilactiontodetermineeligibilitytoremaininthiscountry,nottopunishanunlawfulentry.
.
.
.
Thepurposeofdeportationisnottopunishpasttransgressionsbutrathertoputanendtoacontinuingviolationoftheimmigrationlaws.
").
10DeCanasv.
Bica,424U.
S.
at355(1976)(holdingthatstatelawregulatingemploymentofunauthorizedalienswasnotpreemptedbyfederallaw,inacasedecidedpriortotheINAbeingamendedtocomprehensivelyregulatealienemploymentandexpresslypreemptingmoststatesanctionsuponunauthorizedalienemployment).
Seealso,e.
g.
,Arizona,132S.
Ct.
at2507-2511(whilefindingmanyprovisionsofstateimmigrationenforcementlawwerepreempted,rejectingfacialpreemptionchallengetoprovisionrequiringpolicetoverifyimmigrationstatusoflawfullystoppedpersonswhoweresuspectedofunlawfulstatus);ChamberofCommerceoftheUnitedStatesv.
Whiting,131S.
Ct.
1968(2011)(holdingthatfederallawdidnotpreemptastatemeasurethatauthorizedorrequiredthesuspensionorterminationofthelicensesofbusinessesthatknowinglyorintentionallyhireunauthorizedaliens);Lopez-Valenzuelav.
CountyofMaricopa,719F.
3d1054(9thCir.
2013)(upholdingstatelawbarringstatecourtsfromsettingbailforunlawfullypresentalienschargedwithcertainfelonyoffenses).
11U.
S.
CONST.
,amend.
X.
12WesternTurfAss'nv.
Greenberg,204U.
S.
359,363(1907)("Decisionsofthiscourt.
.
.
recognizethepossession,byeachstate,ofpowersneversurrenderedtothegeneralgovernment;whichpowersthestate,exceptasrestrainedbyitsownConstitutionortheConstitutionoftheUnitedStates,mayexertnotonlyforthepublichealth,thepublicmorals,andthepublicsafety,butforthegeneralorcommongood,forthewell-being,comfort,andgoodorderofthepeople.
");Hamiltonv.
KentuckyDistilleries&WarehouseCo.
,251U.
S.
146,156(1919)("ThattheUnitedStateslacksthepolicepower,andthatthiswasreservedtothestatesbytheTenthAmendment,istrue.
").
SeealsoKelleyv.
Johnson,425U.
S.
238,247(1976)("ThepromotionofsafetyofpersonsandpropertyisunquestionablyatthecoreoftheState'spolicepower.
.
.
.
").
13Seesuprafootnote10(citingillustrativecaseswherestateorlocalmeasuresaddressingunlawfullypresentalienswereupheldagainstpreemptionchallenges);NCSLImmigrationReport,suprafootnote4(discussinglegislationenactedbystatesin2013concerningnon-U.
S.
citizens).
14U.
S.
CONST.
,art.
VI,cl.
2.
15Conversely,thefederalgovernment'sexertionofitsconstitutionalauthorityoveramatterispermissibleevenifit(continued.
.
.
)StateandLocal"Sanctuary"PoliciesLimitingParticipationinImmigrationEnforcementCongressionalResearchService4actioninoneofthreeways:(1)thestatuteexpresslyindicatesitspreemptiveintent(expresspreemption);(2)Congressintendedtowhollyoccupytheregulatoryfield,therebyimplicitlyprecludingsupplementalactionbyastateorlocalgovernmentinthatarea(fieldpreemption);or(3)stateorlocalactionconflictswithorotherwisefrustratesthepurposeofthefederalscheme(conflictpreemption).
16Congressionalintentisparamountintheanalysisastowhetherfederallawpreemptsstateorlocalactivity.
However,courts'preemptionanalysisgenerallybeginswiththe"assumptionthatthehistoricpolicepowersoftheStateswerenottobesupersededbytheFederalActunlessthatwastheclearandmanifestpurposeofCongress.
"17Actingpursuanttoitsauthorityoverimmigration,thefederalgovernmenthasexpresslyorimpliedlypreemptedarangeofstateandlocalactivitiesthatpotentiallyundermineorconflictwithfederalimmigrationenforcementpolicies.
Ofparticularrelevancetothisreport,pursuantto§434ofthePersonalResponsibilityandWorkOpportunityReconciliationActof1996(PRWORA,P.
L.
104-193)and§642oftheIllegalImmigrationReformandImmigrantResponsibilityActof1996(IIRIRA,P.
L.
104-208,Div.
C),Congresshaspreemptedstateormunicipalmeasuresthatbartheexchangeofinformationrelatingtopersons'immigrationstatuswithfederal,state,orlocalauthorities.
Whilethefederalgovernment'spowertopreemptactivityintheareaofimmigrationisextensive,thereareconstitutionallimitstoitspowertoinfluencestateandlocalactivity.
Notably,itmaynotdirectly"commandeer"stateorlocalgovernmentsintotheserviceoffederalimmigrationauthorities.
18Theanti-commandeeringdoctrinewasmostprominentlydefinedbytheSupreme(.
.
.
continued)targetsactivitiesthatmightalsoberegulatedbyastateunderitstraditionalpolicepowers.
KentuckyDistilleries&WarehouseCo.
,251U.
S.
at156("[W]hentheUnitedStatesexertsanyofthepowersconferreduponitbytheConstitution,novalidobjectioncanbebaseduponthefactthatsuchexercisemaybeattendedbythesameincidentswhichattendtheexercisebyastateofitspolicepower,orthatitmaytendtoaccomplishasimilarpurpose.
");Hodelv.
VirginiaSurfaceMin.
andReclamationAss'n,Inc.
,452U.
S.
264,291(1981)("TheCourtlongagorejectedthesuggestionthatCongressinvadesareasreservedtotheStatesbytheTenthAmendmentsimplybecauseitexercisesitsauthorityundertheCommerceClauseinamannerthatdisplacestheStates'exerciseoftheirpolicepowers.
").
16Arizona,132S.
Ct.
at2500-01(citing,e.
g.
,ChamberofCommercev.
Whiting,131S.
Ct.
1968(2011);Crosbyv.
NationalForeignTradeCouncil,530U.
S.
363(2000);FloridaLime&AvocadoGrowers,Inc.
v.
Paul,373U.
S.
132(1963);Ricev.
SantaFeElevatorCorp.
,331U.
S.
218(1947)).
17Medtronic,Inc.
v.
Lohr,518U.
S.
470,485(1996).
SeealsoWyethv.
Levine,555U.
S.
555,565(2009)(similar).
However,insomerecentcases,theCourtdidnotdeemapresumptionagainstpreemptiontobeapplicableinthematterbeforeit.
See,e.
g.
,Arizonav.
InterTribalCouncilofAriz.
,Inc.
,133S.
Ct.
2247(2013)(holdingthatthepresumptionagainstpreemptiondoesnotapplyinElectionClausecases);TarrantReg'lWaterDist.
v.
Herrmann,133S.
Ct.
2120,2132(2013)("Thereis,however,oneinterpretivetoolthatisinapplicable[withrespecttointerstatecompacts]:thepresumptionagainstpre-emption.
");Cuomov.
ClearingHouseAss'n,L.
L.
C.
,557U.
S.
519,534(2009)("Wehavenotinvokedthepresumptionagainstpre-emption,andthinkitunnecessarytodosoingivingforcetotheplaintermsoftheNationalBankAct.
").
ButseeHillmanv.
Maretta,133S.
Ct.
1943(2013)(applyingthepresumptionwithrespecttothepreemptionofstatelawsgoverningdomesticrelations).
18JudicialanalysisoffederaldirectivestothestateshasprimarilycenteredonthepermissibilityoftheserequirementsundertheTenthAmendment.
However,suchactivitiesmightarguablyimplicateotherconstitutionalprovisions,includingtheGuaranteeClause,whichobligatestheUnitedStatesto"guaranteetoeveryStateinthisUnionaRepublicanFormofGovernment.
.
.
.
"U.
S.
CONST.
,art.
IV,§4.
Traditionally,courtshaveviewedclaimspresentedundertheGuaranteeClauseasraisingnon-justiciablepoliticalquestions,butinNewYorkv.
UnitedStates,theSupremeCourtexpresslyleftopenthepossibilitythat"notallclaimsundertheGuaranteeClausepresentnon-justiciablepoliticalquestions.
"505U.
S144,183-185(1992)(alsocitingcaseswheretheCourthadrejectedGuaranteeClauseclaimsonnon-justiciabilitygrounds).
Nonetheless,subsequentlegalchallengestofederalactionthathavebeenpremisedontheGuaranteeClausehaveprovenunsuccessful.
See,e.
g.
,Padavanv.
UnitedStates,82F.
3d23(2ndCir.
1996)(challengebystateofficialstoadequacyoffederalimmigrationenforcementpolicies,whichwaspremisedonviolationoftheGuaranteeClause,deemednon-justiciable);Chilesv.
UnitedStates,69F.
3d1094(11thCir.
1995)(same);CityofNew(continued.
.
.
)StateandLocal"Sanctuary"PoliciesLimitingParticipationinImmigrationEnforcementCongressionalResearchService5CourtinthecasesofNewYorkv.
UnitedStates19andPrintzv.
UnitedStates.
20Thedecisionswerepremisedontheviewthatunderthefederalistsystem,thestatesareunderstoodtobesovereignentitiesdistinctfromthefederalgovernment,21andCongresscannotmuddythisdistinctionbycommandeeringthestatepoliticalbranchestoperformfunctionsonthefederalgovernment'sbehalf.
22InNewYork,theSupremeCourtruledthattheTenthAmendmentbarredthefederalgovernmentfromdirectlycompellingstatelegislaturesto"enactandenforceafederalregulatoryprogram"relatedtothedisposaloflow-levelradioactivewaste.
23InPrintz,theCourtconsideredaTenthAmendmentchallengetoaninterimrequirementunderfederallawthatdirectedstateandlocalpolicetoconductbackgroundchecksonprospectivehandgunpurchases.
TheCourtruledthattheconstitutionalprohibitiononthefederalgovernmentcommandeeringstatestoadministerafederalregulatoryprogramwas"categorical"innatureand,inadditiontobarringthecommandeeringofastate'slegislature,alsopreventedCongressfrom"conscriptingtheState'sofficersdirectly.
"24However,noteveryrequirementimposedbythefederalgovernmentuponsub-federalgovernmententitiesandofficialsnecessarilyviolatestheanti-commandeeringprinciplesidentifiedinPrintzandNewYork.
Anumberoffederalstatutesprovidethatcertaininformationcollectedbystateentitiesmustbereportedtofederalagencies.
25TheCourtinPrintzexpresslydeclinedtoconsiderwhethertheserequirementswereconstitutionallyimpermissible.
Moreover,theCourtdistinguishedreportingrequirementsfromthecasebeforeit,whichinvolved"theforcedparticipationoftheStates.
.
.
intheactualadministrationofafederalprogram.
"26(.
.
.
continued)Yorkv.
UnitedStates,971F.
Supp.
789(S.
D.
N.
Y.
,1997)(claimthatfederallawbarringstateandlocalrestrictionsoninformation-sharingwithfederalimmigrationauthoritiesviolatedtheGuaranteeClauseclaimwasnon-justiciable).
19NewYorkv.
UnitedStates,505U.
S144(1992).
20Printzv.
UnitedStates,521U.
S.
898(1997).
21SeeNewYork,505at155-160(discussingdivisionofsovereigntyinthefederalistsystem,andstatingthatalthough"[t]heactualscopeoftheFederalGovernment'sauthoritywithrespecttotheStateshaschangedovertheyears.
.
.
theconstitutionalstructureunderlyingandlimitingthatauthorityhasnot");Printz,521U.
S.
at518("ItisincontestiblethattheConstitutionestablishedasystemof'dualsovereignty.
'").
TheCourtidentifiedthisdistinctionasadvancingmultiplegoals,includingbetterensuringpoliticalaccountabilitybythefederalandstategovernmentsandreducingtheriskoftyrannythatmightresultintheconcentrationofpowerwithonesovereign.
NewYork,505at181-183;Printz,521at920-921.
22TheCourthasrepeatedlyrecognizedthattheSupremacyClausecontemplatestheenforceabilityoffederallawinstatecourt,andthatthejudicialpoweraffordedunderArticleIIIoftheConstitutionpermitsfederalcourts,inappropriatecircumstances,toorderstateofficialstocomplywithfederallaws.
See,e.
g.
,NewYork,505at178-179(discussingthesecasesanddeemingtheminappositetotheissueofwhetherCongressmaycommanderstatestoperformfederalregulatoryfunctions,asthe"ConstitutioncontainsnoanalogousgrantofauthoritytoCongress"asisgrantedtothecourtsunderArticleIIIandtheSupremacyClause).
23505U.
S.
at161.
24Printz,521U.
S.
at933-934.
25See,e.
g.
,42U.
S.
C.
§5779(providingthat,whenamissingchildreportissubmittedtostateorlocallawenforcement,theagencyshallreportthecasetotheNationalCrimeInformationCenteroftheDepartmentofJustice).
Fordiscussionofvariousfederalreportingrequirementsapplicabletostates,seeRobertA.
Mikos,CanStatesKeepSecretsfromtheFederalGovernment,161U.
PA.
L.
REV.
103(2012).
26Printz,521U.
S.
at918.
Seealsoid.
at936(O'Connor,J.
,concurring)(describingtheCourtashavingrefrained"fromdecidingwhetherotherpurelyministerialreportingrequirementsimposedbyCongressonstateandlocalauthoritiespursuanttoitsCommerceClausepowersaresimilarlyinvalid").
ForcriticismofthedistinctionmadebythePrintzCourtbetweenreportingrequirementsandsituationswherethefederalgovernmentdirectlycompelsstatestoadministerfederalregulatoryprograms,seegenerallyMikos,suprafootnote25.
StateandLocal"Sanctuary"PoliciesLimitingParticipationinImmigrationEnforcementCongressionalResearchService6Federalmeasuresthatimposedirectrequirementsonstateormunicipalauthoritiesappearmostlikelytowithstandananti-commandeeringchallengeifthey(1)arenotdirectedatastate'sregulationoftheactivitiesofprivateparties;27and(2)applytotheactivitiesofprivatepartiesaswellasgovernmentactors.
InRenov.
Condon,theSupremeCourtunanimouslyrejectedaTenthAmendmentchallengetotheDriver'sPrivacyProtectionAct(DPPA),whichrestrictedstatesfromdisclosingorsharingadriver'spersonalinformationwithoutthedriver'sconsent,andalsorequiredthedisclosureofsomecollectedinformation.
28TheCourtdistinguishedtheDPPAfromthefederalenactmentsstruckdowninNewYorkandPrintz,becausetheDPPAsoughttoregulatestates"asownersofdatabases"anddidnot"requiretheStatesintheirsovereigncapacitytoregulatetheirowncitizens.
.
.
[or]enactanylawsorregulations.
.
.
[or]requirestateofficialstoassistintheenforcementoffederalstatutesregulatingprivateindividuals.
"29TheCourtalsovieweditassignificantthattheDPPA'srequirementsrelatingtoinformation-sharingcoveredprivateentitiesaswellasstategovernments,thoughitdeclinedtodefinitivelyruleuponwhetherornotthefederalgovernmentmaydirectlyregulatestateconductonlythroughlawsofgeneralapplicability.
30Whilethefederalgovernmentmaybeconstitutionallybarredfromconscriptingstateauthoritiesintoassistingintheadministrationofafederalprogram,othermeansmaybeavailabletoinfluencestatestoadoptfavoredpolicies.
Forexample,whenCongressactsinanareainwhichitmaypreemptstateactivityinitsentirety,itmightimpose"preconditionstocontinuedstateregulation"intheotherwisepreemptedfield.
31Congressmayalsopermissiblyconditionthereceiptoffederalfundsonstatecompliancewithfederalpolicypreferences.
Conditioningthereceiptoffederalfundingisgenerallypermissiblesolongastheconditions"bearsomerelationshiptothepurposeofthefederalspending,"32andtheconditionedfundsarenotso27Thedegreetowhichthefederallawintrudesintoastate'ssovereigntymightalsobeafactor.
Seesuprafootnote26(citingCourt'sdistinctionbetweenfederallawsthatimposereportingrequirementsuponstatesandthosethatdirectlycompelstatestoadministerfederalprograms);CityofNewYork,179F.
3d29(2ndCir.
1999)(incasedecidedafterPrintzandNewYork,dismissingTenthAmendmentchallengetofederallawproscribingstateorlocalrestrictionsonsharingimmigrationstatusinformationwiththefederalimmigrationauthorities,andsuggestinganalysismightbedifferentifaffectedstaterestrictioncoveredconfidentialinformationgenerally,ratherthanthesharingofaparticulartypeofinformationwithaparticularfederalentity).
28Renov.
Condon,528U.
S.
141(2000).
29Id.
at151.
TheCondonCourtalsostatedthatwhilestatecompliancewiththeDPPAwouldrequire"timeandeffort"bystateofficials,thisdidnotleadtothemeasurebeingincompatiblewithanti-commandeeringprinciples.
Id.
at150.
"ThataStatewishingtoengageincertainactivitymusttakeadministrativeandsometimeslegislativeactiontocomplywithfederalstandardsregulatingthatactivityisacommonplace[situation]thatpresentsnoconstitutionaldefect.
"Id.
(quotingSouthCarolinav.
Baker,485U.
S.
505,514-515(1988)(upholdingfederalprohibitionuponstates'issuanceofunregisteredbondsinthefaceofaTenthAmendmentchallenge)).
SeealsoGarciav.
SanAntonioMetropolitanTransitAuthority,469U.
S.
528(1985)(extensionofovertimeandminimumwagerequirementsoftheFairLaborStandardsActtopublictransitcompanyauthoritydidnotviolateTenthAmendment).
30Condon,528U.
S.
at151.
ForfurtherdiscussionoftheevolutionofSupremeCourtjurisprudenceinthisareasincethe1970s,seeCONGRESSIONALRESEARCHSERVICE,UNITEDSTATESCONSTITUTION:ANALYSISANDINTERPRETATION(CONSTITUTIONANNOTATED),FederalRegulationsAffectingStateActivitiesandInstrumentalities,availableathttp://www.
crs.
gov/conan/default.
aspxmode=topic&doc=Amendment10.
xml&t=1|2|3.
31Printz,521U.
S.
at926;NewYork,505U.
S.
at173-174("WherefederalregulationofprivateactivityiswithinthescopeoftheCommerceClause,wehaverecognizedtheabilityofCongresstoofferStatesthechoiceofregulatingthatactivityaccordingtofederalstandardsorhavingstatelawpre-emptedbyfederalregulation.
").
SeealsoHodelv.
VirginiaSurfaceMining&Recl.
Assn.
,452U.
S.
264(1981)(findingpermissibleafederalstatutethatpreemptedstateregulationofsurfaceminingexceptwhenitcomportedwithfederalstandards);F.
E.
R.
C.
v.
Mississippi,456U.
S.
742(1982)(upholdingconditionalpreemptionofstateregulationofelectricityandgasutilities).
32NewYork,505U.
S.
at167.
SeealsoSouthDakotav.
Dole,483U.
S.
203,207-208(1987)(discussingconstitutionallimitationsuponthedegreetowhichCongressmightconditionallygrantfederalfunds,andupholdingtheconditioning(continued.
.
.
)StateandLocal"Sanctuary"PoliciesLimitingParticipationinImmigrationEnforcementCongressionalResearchService7substantialthattheinducementtocomplywithfederalpreferencesis"socoerciveastopassthepointatwhich'pressureturnsintocompulsion.
'"33SelectStateandLocalLimitationsonImmigrationEnforcementActivitySeveralstatesandmunicipalitieshaveconsideredoradoptedmeasuresintendedtolimittheirparticipationinfederalimmigrationenforcementefforts.
Theselimitationstakeseveralforms.
34Somestatesandlocalitieshavesoughttorestrictpolicecooperationwithfederalimmigrationauthorities'effortstoapprehendremovablealiens.
Othermeasureshavegonefurther,andattemptedtoshieldcertainaliensfromdetectionbyfederalauthorities.
Stillothermeasureshavesoughttoensurethatstateconvictionsforcertaincriminaloffensesdonotcarryimmigrationconsequencesforaconvictedalien.
Thefollowingsectionsdiscusssomeofthenotablestateandlocalrestrictionsuponlawenforcementactivityinthefieldofimmigrationenforcement,includingtherelationshipbetweentheserestrictionsandcurrentfederallaw.
Traditional"Sanctuary"PoliciesAnumberofstatesandmunicipalitieshaveadoptedformalorinformalpolicieswhichprohibitorsubstantiallyrestrictpolicecooperationwithfederalimmigrationenforcementefforts.
Entitiesthathaveadoptedsuchpoliciesaresometimesreferredtoas"sanctuary"jurisdictions,thoughthereisnotnecessarilyaconsensusastothemeaningofthisterm.
35Insomeinstances,jurisdictionshaveself-identifiedas"sanctuary"sites.
36Inothercases,theremightbedisagreementregardingtheaccuracyofsuchadesignation,particularlyifstateorlocallawenforcementcooperateswithfederalimmigrationauthoritiesinsomeareasbutnotothers.
37Any(.
.
.
continued)ofstatereceiptofaportionoffederalhighwayfundsupontheadoptionofminimumdrinkingageof21).
33NationalFederationofIndependentBusinessv.
Sebelius,132S.
Ct.
2566,2604(2012)(quotingDole,483U.
S.
at411,andholdingthatprovisioninAffordableCareAct,whichpermittedwithholdingoffutureMedicaidpaymentstoanystatethatfailedtocomplywithconditionsattachedtooffersforexpandedfederalMedicaidfunding,wasimpermissiblycoercive).
34Seesuprafootnote4(citingsourcesidentifyingvariousstateandlocalrestrictionsonimmigrationenforcementactivity).
35Theterm"sanctuary"jurisdictionisnotdefinedbyfederalstatuteorregulation,thoughithasbeenusedbytheOfficeoftheInspectorGeneralattheU.
S.
DepartmentofJusticetoreference"jurisdictionsthatmayhavestatelaws,localordinances,ordepartmentalpolicieslimitingtheroleoflocallawenforcementagenciesandofficersintheenforcementofimmigrationlaws.
"U.
S.
Dep'tofJustice,OfficeoftheInspectorGeneral,AuditDivision,CooperationofSCAAPRecipientsintheRemovalofCriminalAliensfromtheUnitedStates,January2007(redactedpublicversion),atvii,n.
44(defining"sanctuary"policiesforpurposesofstudy).
36See,e.
g.
,SanFrancisco,CA,Admin.
Code,Chapter12H:ImmigrationStatus(SanFranciscoordinancerestrictingcooperationwithfederalimmigrationenforcementeffortsandreferringtoSanFranciscoasa"CityofRefuge")(hereinafter"SanFranciscoOrdinance"),availableathttp://sfgsa.
org/index.
aspxpage=1067;Oakland,CA.
,Res.
81310(2008)(reaffirmingOakland'sstatusasa"CityofRefuge"forunlawfullypresentaliensandexpressingoppositiontofederalimmigrationraidsatsomecitylocations).
37SeeOp-Ed,"SanctuaryCityNotL.
A.
,"L.
A.
TIMES,Aug.
26,2011(disputingcharacterizationofLosAngelesasa"sanctuary"jurisdiction,andcitingmatterswherelocalpolicecooperatewithfederalimmigrationauthorities).
SeegenerallyRoseCuisonVillazor,WhatIsa"Sanctuary",61SMUL.
REV.
133(2008)(discussingdifferingmeaningsgiventotheterm"sanctuary"whendescribingpoliciestowardsunlawfullypresentaliens).
StateandLocal"Sanctuary"PoliciesLimitingParticipationinImmigrationEnforcementCongressionalResearchService8referencebythisreporttoapolicyofaparticularjurisdictionisintendedonlytoprovideanillustrativeexampleofthetypeofmeasureoccasionallyreferencedindiscussionsof"sanctuary"policies.
38ThesereferencesshouldnotbetakentoindicateCRSisoftheviewthataparticularjurisdictionisa"sanctuary"forunlawfullypresentaliens.
Whilestateorlocalmeasureslimitingpoliceparticipationinimmigrationenforcementexistedbeforehand,39manyoftherecent"sanctuary"-typeinitiativestracetheirlineagebacktoactionsbyU.
S.
churchesthatprovidedrefugetounauthorizedCentralAmericanaliensfleeingcivilunrestinthe1980s.
Anumberofstatesandmunicipalitiesissueddeclarationsinsupportofthesechurches'actions.
40Otherswentfurtherandenactedmoresubstantivemeasuresintendedtolimitpoliceinvolvementinfederalimmigrationenforcementactivities.
Thesehaveincluded,amongotherthings,restrictingstateandlocalpolicefromarrestingpersonsforimmigrationviolations;limitingthesharingofimmigration-relatedinformationwithfederalauthorities,andbarringpolicefromquestioningapersonabouthisorherimmigrationstatus.
41LimitingArrestsforFederalImmigrationViolationsAspreviouslynoted,violationsoffederalimmigrationlawmaybecriminalorcivilinnature,withalienremovalunderstoodtobeacivilproceeding.
42Someimmigration-relatedconductpotentiallyconstitutesaremovableoffenseandmayalsobesubjecttocriminalsanction.
Forexample,analienwhoknowinglyenterstheUnitedStateswithoutauthorizationisnotonlypotentiallysubjecttoremoval,43butcouldalsobechargedwithacriminaloffenserelatingtounlawfulentry.
44Ontheotherhand,someviolationsoftheINAareexclusivelycriminalorcivilinnature.
Mostnotably,analien'sunauthorizedimmigrationstatusmakeshimorherremovable,butabsentadditionalfactors(e.
g.
,havingreenteredtheUnitedStatesafterbeingformallyremoved),45unlawfulpresencedoesnotconstituteacriminaloffense.
38See,e.
g.
,FAIRCompilationofStateandLocalRestrictions,suprafootnote4(labelingmeasuresofvariousjurisdictionsas"sanctuarypolicies");OrdeF.
Kittrie,Federalism,Deportation,andCrimeVictimsAfraidtoCallthePolice,91IOWAL.
REV.
1449(2006)(discussinganddescribingvariousstateandlocallawenforcement"sanctuary"policies).
39Forexample,in1979,theLosAngelesPoliceDepartmentissuedSpecialOrder40,whichbarredpoliceofficersfromarrestingpersonsforsuspectedviolationsofthefederalstatutecriminalizingillegalentry(reversingapolicycontainedinapreviouspoliceorder);prohibitedtheinitiationofpoliceaction"withtheobjectiveofdiscoveringthealienstatusofaperson";andestablishedaprocessandcriteriafornotifyingfederalimmigrationofficialswhenanunlawfullypresentalienwasarrestedoncriminalcharges.
LosAngeles,CAPoliceDept.
,SpecialOrder40:UndocumentedAliens,Nov.
29,1979,availableathttp://www.
lapdonline.
org/assets/pdf/SO_40.
pdf(hereinafter"LAPDOrder").
40SeegenerallyJorgeL.
Carro,MunicipalandStateSanctuaryDeclarations:InnocuousSymbolismorImproperDictates,16PEPP.
L.
REV.
297(1989)(identifyinganddistinguishingvariousstateandlocalresponsesinsupportofchurchactions).
41SeeKittrie,suprafootnote38,at1455(surveyinglocal"sanctuary"policiesanddescribingthemasdoing"oneormoreofthefollowing:(1)limit[ing]inquiriesaboutaperson'simmigrationstatusunlessinvestigatingillegalactivityotherthanmerestatusasanunauthorizedalien('don'task');(2)limit[ing]arrestsordetentionsforviolationofimmigrationlaws('don'tenforce');and(3)limit[ing]provisiontofederalauthoritiesofimmigrationstatusinformation('don'ttell')").
42SeePadilla,559U.
S.
at365;Lopez-Mendoza,468U.
S.
at1038-39.
43INA§212(a)(6)(A)(i),8U.
S.
C.
§1182(a)(6)(A)(i)(providingthatanalienisinadmissibleandsubjecttoremovalifheorsheispresentintheUnitedStateswithouthavebeenadmittedorparoled,orarrivesintheUnitedStatesatanytimeorplaceotherthanasdesignatedbytheAttorneyGeneral(nowtheSecretaryofHomelandSecurity)).
44INA§275,8U.
S.
C.
§1325.
45INA§276,8U.
S.
C.
§1326.
Fordiscussionofothercriminalstatutespotentiallyapplicabletounlawfullypresent(continued.
.
.
)StateandLocal"Sanctuary"PoliciesLimitingParticipationinImmigrationEnforcementCongressionalResearchService9Somejurisdictionshaveadoptedformalorinformalmeasuresthatrestrictorbarpoliceofficersfrommakingarrestsforviolationsoffederalimmigrationlaw.
Insomecases,theserestrictionsprohibitpolicefrommakingarrestsfor"civil"violationsoffederalimmigrationlaw,suchasunlawfulpresence.
46Inotherinstances,theserestrictionsarecraftedmorebroadlyandmayalsorestrictarrestsforsomecriminalviolationsoffederalimmigrationlaw.
47Stateorlocalrestrictionsonpoliceauthoritytoarrestpersonsforfederalimmigrationlawviolationsdonotappeartoraisesignificantlegalissues.
WhiletheINAexpresslyallowsstateandlocallawenforcementtodirectlyengageinspecifiedimmigrationenforcementactivitieswithintheparametersestablishedbytheapplicableINAprovision,48nothingintheINAdirectlycompelssuchparticipation(andindeed,anyrequirementwouldraisesignificantanti-commandeeringissuesundertheTenthAmendment).
49Moreover,followingtheSupremeCourt'sdecisioninArizonav.
UnitedStates,itappearsthatstatesandlocalitiesaregenerallypreemptedfrommakingarrestsforcivilviolationsoftheINAintheabsenceofeitherspecificfederalstatutoryauthorizationorthe"request,approval,orinstructionfromtheFederalGovernment.
"50LimitingInformation-SharingwithFederalImmigrationAuthoritiesOvertheyears,somestatesandlocalitiesrestrictedgovernmentagenciesoremployeesfromsharinginformationwithfederalimmigrationauthorities,primarilytopreventfederalauthoritiesfromusingsuchinformationtoidentifyandapprehendunlawfullypresentaliensforremoval.
Someoftheserestrictionshaveexistedfordecades,whileothersareofmorerecentvintage.
51(.
.
.
continued)aliens,seeCRSLegalSidebarWSLG563,AnOverviewofImmigration-RelatedCrimes,byMichaelJohnGarcia.
46See,e.
g.
,SanJose,CA,PoliceDepartmentDutyManual(redactedpublicversion)(2015),at501("OfficerswillnotdetainorarrestanypersonnotsuspectedofaStatefelonyorStateorlocalmisdemeanororinfractionviolationsolelyonthebasisoftheperson'scitizenshiporstatusundercivilimmigrationlaws.
"),availableathttp://www.
sjpd.
org/Records/DutyManual;Washington,DC,Mayor'sOrder2011-174(Oct.
19,2011),at2("NopersonshallbedetainedsolelyonthebeliefthatheorsheisnotpresentlegallyintheUnitedStatesorthatheorshehascommittedacivilimmigrationviolation.
"),availableathttp://dcregs.
dc.
gov/Gateway/NoticeHome.
aspxNoticeID=1784041(hereinafter"DCOrder");OR.
REV.
STAT.
§181.
850(barringuseofOregonstatefundsorresourcestoarrestpersonsforpresenceinviolationoffederalimmigrationlaws).
SeegenerallyFAIRCompilationofStateandLocalRestrictions,suprafootnote4(identifyingsimilarrestrictionsinotherjurisdictions).
47See,e.
g.
,LAPDOrder,suprafootnote39(barringarrestsforfederalcrimeofunlawfulentry);Phoenix,AZ,PoliceDepartmentOperationsOrderManual,at1.
4(rev.
2011)("TheinvestigationandenforcementoffederallawsrelatingtoillegalentryandresidenceintheUnitedStatesisspecificallyassignedto[ImmigrationandCustomsEnforcementwithinDHS].
"),availableathttps://www.
phoenix.
gov/policesite/Documents/089035.
pdf.
https://www.
phoenix.
gov/policesite/Documents/089035.
pdf.
48FordiscussionofvariousINAprovisionsthatauthorizeimmigrationenforcementactivitybystatesandlocalities(oftentimesunderthedirectionoffederalauthorities),seeCRSReportR41423,AuthorityofStateandLocalPolicetoEnforceFederalImmigrationLaw,byMichaelJohnGarciaandKateM.
Manuel.
49Seesupradiscussionat"LegalBackground.
"50Arizona,132S.
Ct.
at2507.
TheArizonaCourt'sdiscussionofstates'authoritytoenforcefederalimmigrationlawwasinreferencetoarrestsfornon-criminalimmigrationstatusviolations.
TheCourtdidnotopineastowhetherstatelawenforcementagenciesarealsoprecludedfrommakingarrestsforcriminalviolationsoffederalimmigrationlaw.
However,lowercourtshavegenerallyrecognizedthatstateandlocalpolicearenotpreemptedfrommakingsucharrests.
See,e.
g.
,Gonzalesv.
CityofPeoria,722F.
2d468(9thCir.
1983),overruledonothergroundsbyHodgers-Durginv.
delaVina,199F.
3d1037(9thCir.
1999).
51See,e.
g.
,SanFranciscoOrdinance,suprafootnote36(enactedin1989,andsubsequentlyamendedtopermitcommunicationwithfederalimmigrationauthoritiesregardingalienswhohavecommittedfelonies);NewYorkCity,(continued.
.
.
)StateandLocal"Sanctuary"PoliciesLimitingParticipationinImmigrationEnforcementCongressionalResearchService10In1996,Congresssoughttoendtheserestrictionsoninformation-sharingthroughprovisionscontainedinthePersonalResponsibilityandWorkOpportunityReconciliationAct(PRWORA)52andIllegalImmigrationReformandImmigrantResponsibilityAct(IIRIRA).
53NeitherPRWORAnorIIRIRArequirestateorlocalgovernmententitiestoshareimmigration-relatedinformationwithfederalauthorities.
54Instead,theseprovisionsbaranyrestrictionsthatpreventstateorlocalgovernmententitiesorofficialsfromvoluntarilycommunicatingwithfederalimmigrationauthoritiesregardingaperson'simmigrationstatus.
55PRWORA§434barsstateandlocalgovernmentsfromimposinganyprohibitionorrestrictiononastateorlocalgovernmententitythatpreventsitfromsendingorreceivinginformation,toorfromfederalimmigrationauthorities,regardingthe"immigrationstatus"ofanindividual.
IIRIRA§642isbroaderandmoredetailedinscope.
Itbarsanyrestrictiononafederal,state,orlocalgovernmentalentityorofficial'sabilitytosendorreceiveinformationregarding"immigrationorcitizenshipstatus"toorfromfederalimmigrationauthorities.
56Itfurtherprovidesthatnopersonoragencymayprohibitafederal,state,orlocalgovernmententityfrom(1)sendinginformationregardingimmigrationstatusto,orrequestinginformationfrom,federalimmigrationauthorities;(2)maintaininginformationregardingimmigrationstatus;or(3)exchangingsuchinformationwithanyotherfederal,state,orlocalgovernmententity.
57Shortlyafterthesemeasureswereenacted,theCityofNewYork,whichhadineffectapolicythatlimitedthesharingofinformationwithfederalimmigrationauthorities,58broughtsuitchallengingtheconstitutionalityofPRWORA§434andIIRIRA§642.
Amongotherthings,59thecityalleged(.
.
.
continued)NY,Exec.
Order124,CityPolicyConcerningAliens(1989)(limitingtransmissionofinformationaboutanalientofederalimmigrationauthoritiesexceptincertaincircumstances,includingwhenthealienwassuspectedofcriminalactivity)(hereinafter"1989NewYorkCityOrdinance"),availableathttp://www.
nycourts.
gov/library/queens/PDF_files/Orders/ord124.
pdf(revokedandreplacedin2003byNewYorkCityExec.
Order34,asamendedbyExec.
Order41,topermitinformation-sharinginabroaderrangeofcircumstances,butnotonthebasisofalien'sunlawfulimmigrationstatus;copiesoftheseorderscanbeaccessedathttp://www.
nyc.
gov/html/imm/html/eoll/eoll.
shtml);GovernorofMaine,Exec.
Order13FY04/05,ConcerningAccesstoStateServicesByAllEntitledMaineResidents(Apr.
9,2004)(limitingthesharingofinformationaboutalienswithfederalimmigrationauthorities,exceptwhenanalienisinvolvedinillegalactivityotherthanunlawfulstatus;rescindedbyExec.
Order08FY11/12(Jan.
6,2011)).
52P.
L.
104-193,§434(1996);8U.
S.
C.
§1644.
53P.
L.
104-208,Div.
C,§642(1996);8U.
S.
C.
§1373.
54WhetherCongresscouldpermissiblyrequirestatesandlocalitiestosubmitcollectedinformationtofederalimmigrationauthoritieshasnotbeendefinitivelyresolved.
Aspreviouslynoted,theSupremeCourtinPrintzdistinguishedfederallawsrequiringstatestoreportcertaininformationtofederalagenciesfrominstanceswhereitcompelledstateauthoritiestoadministerafederalregulatoryprogramastoprivateparties,andchosenottoopineuponwhetherreportingrequirementsviolatedanti-commandeeringprinciples.
Printz,521U.
S.
at918.
Seealsosupradiscussionat"LegalBackground.
"55Theprovisionsexpresslyapplytorestrictionsonimmigration-relatedcommunicationbetweenfederal,state,andlocalgovernmententitiesandemployees.
In2005,afederaldistrictcourtruledthatneitherPRWORA§434norIIRIRA§642preventeditfromissuingaprotectiveorderinacasethatbarredplaintiffs,whowereprivatecitizens,fromdisclosingtheimmigrationstatusofaninterveningpartyinthelitigation.
Dayv.
Sebelius,227F.
R.
D.
668(D.
Kan.
2005).
568U.
S.
C.
§1373(a).
578U.
S.
C.
§1373(b).
Federalimmigrationauthoritiesarealsorequiredtorespondtoimmigrationstatusorcitizenshipverificationrequestsmadebystateorlocalauthoritiespertainingtopersonswithintheirjurisdiction.
8U.
S.
C.
§1373(c).
581989NewYorkCityOrdinance,suprafootnote51.
59Thecityalsoarguedthattheinformation-sharingprovisionsinPRWORAandIIRIRAviolatedtheGuaranteeClause(continued.
.
.
)StateandLocal"Sanctuary"PoliciesLimitingParticipationinImmigrationEnforcementCongressionalResearchService11thattheprovisionsfaciallyviolatetheTenthAmendment,becausetheybarstatesandlocalitiesfromcontrollingthedegreetowhichtheirofficialsmaycooperatewithfederalimmigrationauthorities.
AfederaldistrictcourtdismissedthisclaiminCityofNewYorkv.
UnitedStates,andathree-judgepaneloftheU.
S.
CourtofAppealsfortheSecondCircuitaffirmedthisrulingina1999decision.
ThecircuitcourtobservedthatunlikethestatutesstruckdowninNewYorkandPrintz,theinformation-sharingprovisionsinPRWORAandIIRIRAdidnotdirectlycompelstateauthoritiestoadministerandenforceafederalregulatoryprogram.
60Instead,theseprovisionsprotected"thevoluntaryexchange"ofimmigrationinformationbetweenfederalandstateauthorities.
61Accordingtothecircuitcourt,"informed,extensive,andcooperativeinteractionofavoluntarynature"betweenstatesandthefederalauthoritiesisanintegralfeatureoftheAmericansystemofdualsovereignty,andtheinformation-sharingprovisionsofPRWORAandIIRIRAwereconsistentwiththeseprinciples.
62TheSecondCircuitraisedthepossibilitythatthefederalgovernmentmight,insomecircumstances,impermissiblyintrudeuponstateandlocalentities'authoritytocontrolinformationintheirpossession.
63However,thecourtfoundthattheCityofNewYorkhadnotprovidedevidencethatthiswassuchaninstance,astheaffectedcitypolicyonlylimitedthesharingofaparticulartypeofinformation(i.
e.
,aperson'simmigrationstatus)withaparticularfederalagency(i.
e.
,theagencyresponsibleforenforcingfederalimmigrationlaw).
64Accordingtothecircuitcourt,theTenthAmendmentdoesnotprovidestatesandlocalentitieswiththe"untrammeledrighttoforbidallvoluntarycooperationbystateorlocalofficialswithparticularfederalprograms.
"65Thecourtthereforerejectedthecity'sconstitutionalchallengetotheinformation-sharingprovisionsofPRWORAandIIRIRA,findingthattheydidnotfaciallyviolatetheTenthAmendment.
TheCityofNewYorksoughttoappealthedecisiontotheSupremeCourt,butitspetitionforcertiorariwasdenied.
66Afewmonthslater,however,theCourtissueditsdecisioninRenov.
(.
.
.
continued)oftheConstitution,U.
S.
CONST.
art.
IV,§4,byinterferingwiththecity'soversightofitsemployees.
Thisclaimwasrejectedbythereviewingcourts.
CityofNewYorkv.
UnitedStates,971F.
Supp.
789(S.
D.
N.
Y.
1997)(rulingthatclaimwasnon-justiciable);179F.
3d29(2ndCir.
1999)(evenassumingjusticiabilityofaGuaranteeClauseclaim,PRWORAandIIRIRAinformation-sharingprovisionswerepermissible).
Seealsosuprafootnote18(discussingjudicialtreatmentofGuaranteeClauseclaims).
60SeeCityofNewYork,179F.
3dat35.
61Id.
62Id.
63Id.
at37("Theeffectof[PRWORA§434andIIRIRA§642]…istonullifyanOrderthatsinglesoutandforbidsvoluntarycooperationwithfederalimmigrationofficials.
WhethertheseSectionswouldsurviveaconstitutionalchallengeinthecontextofgeneralizedconfidentialitypoliciesthatarenecessarytotheperformanceoflegitimatemunicipalfunctionsandthatincludefederalimmigrationstatusisnotbeforeusandweoffernoopiniononthatquestion.
").
64AtthetimeCityofNewYorkwasdecided,thefederalagencyprimarilyresponsibleforimmigrationenforcement(andspecificallyreferencedbyPRWORA§434andIIRIRA§642)wastheImmigrationandNaturalizationService(INS).
FollowingtheestablishmentoftheDepartmentofHomelandSecurity(DHS)pursuanttotheHomelandSecurityActof2002(P.
L.
107-296),theINSwasabolishedanditsenforcementfunctionsweretransferredtoDHS.
See6U.
S.
C.
§251.
65CityofNewYork,179F.
3dat35.
66528U.
S.
1115(2000).
StateandLocal"Sanctuary"PoliciesLimitingParticipationinImmigrationEnforcementCongressionalResearchService12Condon,discussedinmoredetailearlierinthisreport,67whereitfoundthatanotherfederalstatutethatregulatedthedisseminationofinformationcollectedbystateauthoritiesdidnotviolatetheTenthAmendment.
WhileitmightbearguedthattheCondondecisionprovidessupportfortheconstitutionalvalidityofPRWORA§434andIIRIRA§642,68nocourtappearstohaveassessedtheimplicationsoftheCondondecisionuponthesemeasures.
SincetheSecondCircuit'sruling,itappearsthattherehavebeennojudicialrulingsthathavequestionedthevalidityoftheinformation-sharingprovisionsinPRWORAandIIRIRA.
Althoughsomestateandlocalmeasuresthatpurporttolimitofficialsfromsharingimmigration-relatedinformationwithfederalimmigrationauthoritiesremainineffect,69anyattemptbythestateorlocalitytoenforcetheserestrictionsoninformation-sharingcouldbechallengedonpreemptiongrounds.
LimitingPoliceInquiriesintoPersons'ImmigrationStatusMosttraditional"sanctuary"policiesplacerestrictionsuponpoliceinquiriesorinvestigationsintoaperson'simmigrationstatus.
Somepoliciesprovide,forexample,thatpoliceshouldnotquestionapersonabouthisorherimmigrationstatusexceptaspartofacriminalinvestigation.
70Otherpoliciesmightprovidemorespecificrestrictionsthatfocusuponlawenforcement'squestioningofcrimevictimsandwitnesses.
71Stillotherpoliciesmorebroadlylimitstateorlocalofficialsfromgatheringinformationaboutpersons'immigrationstatus.
7267Seesupradiscussionat"LegalBackground.
"68AlthoughthefederalstatuteupheldintheCondoncaseisinsomewayssimilartotheinformation-sharingprovisionsinIIRIRAandPRWORA,thestatutesarenotwhollyanalogous.
Whileeachstatuteregulatesinformationcollectedbystates,thestatuteupheldinCondonwascharacterizedbytheCourtasoneofgeneralapplicability,regulatingbothstates,assuppliersofmotorvehicleinformation,andprivatepartiesthatresoldtheinformationininterstatecommerce.
Condon,528U.
S.
at151.
Theinformation-sharingprovisionsinIIRIRAandPRWORA,however,onlyaddressinformationcollectedandsharedbetweengovernmententities.
ButseeDep'tofJustice,BriefonOppositionofPetitiontoGrantCert.
,CityofNewYorkv.
UnitedStates,528U.
S.
115(No.
99-328),at12(characterizingtheinformation-sharingprovisionsofIIRIRAandPRWORAascomponentsoflargerregulationschemesthatalsoaddressedprivateactivity).
Whilethereisjudicialsupportfortheconstitutionalityoffederalregulationofstateconductthroughlawsofgeneralapplicability,theCondoncourtexpresslydeclinedto"decidewhethergeneralapplicabilityisaconstitutionalrequirementforfederalregulationoftheStates….
"Condon,528U.
S.
at151.
69See,e.
g.
,NewYorkCity,NY,Exec.
Order41,City-WidePrivacyPolicy(2003)(restrictingdisclosureofimmigration-relatedinformation);SanFranciscoOrdinance,suprafootnote36(barringtherequestordisseminationofimmigrationstatusinformation).
Acommonfeatureofmanystateorlocalinformation-sharingrestrictionsislanguagepermittingcommunicationwhenitisrequiredbylaw.
Arguably,suchlanguagecouldbeinterpretedtoallowcompliancewiththeinformation-sharingprovisionsofIIRIRAandPRWORA,asthesemeasures"require"voluntarycommunicationtobepermitted.
70See,e.
g.
,LAPDOrder,suprafootnote39("Officersshallnotinitiatepoliceactionwiththeobjectiveofdiscoveringthealienstatusofaperson.
");DCOrder,suprafootnote46(publicsafetyemployees"shallnotinquireaboutaperson'simmigrationstatus.
.
.
forthepurposeofinitiatingcivilenforcementofimmigrationproceedingsthathavenonexustoacriminalinvestigation.
");SanFranciscoOrdinance,suprafootnote36(barringlawenforcementfromstoppingorquestionspersonssolelyonthebasisofimmigrationstatus).
71SeeDCOrder,suprafootnote46("ItshallbethepolicyofPublicSafetyAgenciesnottoinquireabouttheimmigrationstatusofcrimevictims,witnesses,orotherswhocallorapproachthepoliceseekingassistance.
");NewHaven,CN,Mayor'sOffice,PressRelease,NewHavenPoliceIssueExecutiveOrder–NoResidentShouldBeAfraidofReportingCrime(Dec.
14,2006)(discussingGeneralOrder06-2,which,amongotherthings,establishespolicyofNewHavenPoliceDepartmentnottoinquireintotheimmigrationstatusofcrimevictimsandwitnesses),availableathttp://www.
cityofnewhaven.
com/Mayor/ReadMore.
aspID={874974A9-AC89-465B-A649-57D122E9FAF9}.
72See,e.
g.
,SanFranciscoOrdinance,suprafootnote36(generalprohibitionongatheringinformationaboutimmigrationstatussubjecttoexceptions,includingforalienswhohavecommittedfelonies);Chicago,IL,ChicagoMunicipalCodeChapter2-173,WelcomingCityOrdinance(subjecttospecificexceptions,includingasrequiredbylaw,"[n]oagentoragencyshallrequestinformationaboutorotherwiseinvestigate.
.
.
thecitizenshiporimmigration(continued.
.
.
)StateandLocal"Sanctuary"PoliciesLimitingParticipationinImmigrationEnforcementCongressionalResearchService13AlthoughPRWORA§434andIIRIRA§642preventstateorlocalrestrictionsonsharinginformationaboutaperson'simmigrationstatuswithfederalimmigrationauthorities,theseprovisionsdonotrequirestateorlocalpolicetoactuallycollectsuchinformation.
73Restrictingtheauthorityofpolicetoquestionapersonabouthisorherimmigrationstatushelpsensurethatlawenforcementlacksanyinformationthatcouldbesharedwithfederalimmigrationauthorities.
Itcouldbearguedthat,eventhoughstateorlocalrestrictionsonpolicequestioningofpersonsregardingtheirimmigrationstatusisnotexpresslypreemptedbyfederalstatute,thesemeasuresarenonethelessimpliedlypreemptedbytheinformation-sharingprovisionsofIIRIRAandPRWORA.
However,thisargumentwasrejectedbyaCaliforniastateappellatecourtinthecontextofalegalchallengetotheLosAngelesPoliceDepartment'srestrictionsoninvestigationsintopersons'immigrationstatus.
74Thefederalcourtshavenotdirectlyconsideredthisissue.
InArizonav.
UnitedStates,theSupremeCourtfoundthataprovisionofanArizonastatute,whichrequiredpolicetocontactfederalauthoritiestoverifytheimmigrationstatusofcertainstoppedindividuals,wasnotfaciallypreempted.
75Inreachingthisconclusion,theCourtdidnotsuggestthatfederallawmightpreemptstatesorlocalitiesfromrestrictingthecircumstancesinwhichpolicemightquestionindividualsabouttheirimmigrationstatus.
76Indeed,giventhattheArizonaCourtheldthatstateandlocalpolicewerelargelypreemptedfrommakingarrestsforimmigrationstatusviolations,itseemsunlikelythatafederalcourtwouldfindthatstateorlocalmeasuresthatlimitedpolicequestioningofpersonsabouttheirimmigrationstatuswouldbeviewedaspreemptedbytheINA.
DecliningtoHonorImmigrationDetainersAnimmigrationdetainerisadocumentbywhichU.
S.
ImmigrationandCustomsEnforcement(ICE)advisesotherlawenforcementagenciesofitsinterestinindividualalienswhomthoseagenciesarecurrentlyholdinginrelationtocriminalviolations.
77ICEanditspredecessor,theImmigrationandNaturalizationService(INS),haveuseddetainersasonemeansofobtaining(.
.
.
continued)statusofanyperson.
.
.
.
").
73See8U.
S.
C.
§1373(b)(barringstateorlocalrestrictionsonsending,maintaining,orexchangingimmigrationstatusinformationwithfederalimmigrationauthorities).
74Sturgeonv.
Bratton,95Cal.
Rptr.
3d718(Cal.
Dist.
Ct.
App.
2009).
SeealsoLAPDOrder,suprafootnote39(barringinitiationofpoliceactionforsolepurposeofdeterminingperson'simmigrationstatus).
75Arizona,132S.
Ct.
at2508-2509.
TheSupremeCourt'sanalysisturnedprimarilyontheissueofwhetherArizona'srequirementthatpolicecommunicatewithfederalimmigrationauthoritieswaspreemptedbyfederallaw,ratherthantheissueofwhenitmightbeappropriatetoquestionstoppedindividualsabouttheirimmigrationstatus.
Indeed,theCourtsuggestedthatimmigrationstatusinvestigationsbyArizonapolicecouldbesubjecttoas-appliedchallenges.
Id.
at2509.
76Tothecontrary,theArizonaCourtconstruedfederalimmigrationlawasgenerallypermittingstateandlocalpolicetoplayalimitedroleinimmigrationenforcement.
Id.
at2506(statepoliceweregenerallypreemptedfromarrestingaliensforsuspectedimmigrationviolationsintheabsenceofanauthorizingfederalstatute).
77Thestandarddetainerform(FormI-247)allowsICEtoindicatethatithastakencertainactionsthatcouldleadtothealien'sremoval(e.
g.
,initiatingremovalproceedingsoraninvestigationintothealien'sremovability).
TheformalsoallowsICEtorequestthattheotheragencytakecertainactionsthatcouldfacilitateremoval(e.
g.
,holdingthealientemporarily,notifyingICEpriortoreleasingthealien).
See,e.
g.
,U.
S.
Dep'tofHomelandSecurity,ImmigrationDetainer—NoticeofAction,DHSFormI-247(12/12),availableathttp://www.
ice.
gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/immigration-detainer-form.
pdf.
ICEalsoobtainscustodyofaliensforremovalpurposesthroughmeansotherthandetainers.
SeeCRSReportR42690,ImmigrationDetainers:LegalIssues,byKateM.
Manuel,atp.
1n.
3.
StateandLocal"Sanctuary"PoliciesLimitingParticipationinImmigrationEnforcementCongressionalResearchService14custodyofaliensforpurposesofremovalproceedingssinceatleast1950.
78However,ICE'simplementationoftheSecureCommunitiesprogramintheperiodbetween2008and2014raisednumerousquestionsaboutdetainers.
79Thisprogramrelieduponinformationsharingbetweenvariouslevelsandagenciesofgovernmenttoidentifypotentiallyremovablealiens.
80Detainerswerethenissuedforsomeofthesealiens.
DHSemphasizedthatitprioritized"criminalaliens,"thosewhoposedathreattopublicsafety,andrepeatimmigrationviolatorsforremovalthroughSecureCommunities,81andtheformerDirectorofICEfurtherinstructedthat,among"criminalaliens,"thefocuswastobeuponthoseconvictedof"aggravatedfelonies,"asdefinedintheINA;thoseconvictedofotherfelonies;andthoseconvictedofthreeormoremisdemeanors.
82However,therewerereportsofdetainersissuedforpersonswhowerenotconvictedofanyoffense,orwhosesoleoffensewasamisdemeanor.
83Asaresultoftheseandrelatedreports,severaljurisdictionsadoptedpoliciesofdecliningimmigrationdetainerrequestsforatleastsomealiens.
Inmanycases,thesejurisdictionswillhonorimmigrationdetainersforalienswhoarebeingheldforfelonycrimesorwhoareotherwisebelievedtoposeathreattothecommunity,butwilldeclinetohonorimmigrationdetainersissuedforotheraliens(e.
g.
,thosewhohavecommittednon-violentmisdemeanoroffenses).
84Inother78See,e.
g.
,Slavikv.
Miller,89F.
Supp.
575,576(W.
D.
Pa.
1950)(stating,ofanalienwhomimmigrationofficialssoughtforpurposesofremoval,that"adetainerhasbeenlodgedforthebodyofthepetitioneratthetimethatthefulfillmentofthesentencehasexpired").
79Inparticular,SecureCommunitieswasseentoresultintheissuanceofmoredetainersforaliensatearlierstagesincriminalproceedingsthanwasthepracticepreviously.
See,e.
g.
,Brizuelav.
Feliciano,No.
3:12CV226,MemorandumofLawinSupportofMotionforOrdertoShowCauseandLeavetoPropoundPrecertificationDiscoveryRequests,at7(filedD.
Conn.
,Feb.
22,2012)("ImmigrationdetainersareanintegralpartoftheSecureCommunitiesprogram;indeed,theprogramdependsonimmigrationdetainerstowork.
");Nat'lDayLaborerOrganizingNetworkv.
U.
S.
ICE,No.
1:10-cv-3488,DeclarationofAnnBensoninSupportofPlaintiffs'OppositiontoDefendants'MotionforStay(filedS.
D.
N.
Y.
,Nov.
18,2011)("Thebeliefamongtheadvocacycommunityisthatifalocaljurisdictionrefusestohonordetainerrequests,thentheconsequencesofSecureCommunitiescanbeaverted.
").
80See,e.
g.
,U.
S.
ICE,SecureCommunities:TheBasics,availableathttp://www.
ice.
gov/secure_communities(lastaccessed:April29,2015).
81Id.
82JohnMorton,Director,U.
S.
ICE,CivilImmigrationEnforcement:PrioritiesfortheApprehension,Detention,andRemovalofAliens,Mar.
2,2011,availableathttp://www.
ice.
gov/doclib/news/releases/2011/110302washingtondc.
pdf.
TheprioritiesthatMr.
MortonarticulatedappeartohaveremainedineffectuntilNovember20,2014,whenthey(alongwiththeSecureCommunitiesprogram)werereplaced.
SeeU.
S.
Dep'tofHomelandSecurity,SecretaryJehCharlesJohnson,SecureCommunities,Nov.
20,2014,availableathttp://www.
dhs.
gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_secure_communities.
pdf(discontinuationoftheSecureCommunitiesprogram);U.
S.
Dep'tofHomelandSecurity,SecretaryJehCharlesJohnson,PoliciesfortheApprehension,DetentionandRemovalofUndocumentedImmigrants,Nov.
20,2014,availableathttp://www.
dhs.
gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_prosecutorial_discretion.
pdf(supersedingtheMarch2,2011,memorandumoncivilimmigrationenforcementpriorities).
83See,e.
g.
,CommentsonU.
S.
ImmigrationandCustomsEnforcementDraftDetainerPolicy,availableathttp://www.
legalactioncenter.
org/sites/default/files/docs/lac/NGO-DetainerCommentsFinal-10-1-2010.
pdf.

ThesecommentsweremadeinresponsetochangesinICE'sdetainerpolicyproposedin2010.
CriticsofSecureCommunitiesalsoallegedthatstateandlocalofficialsheldalienslongerthanthe48hours(excludingweekendsandfederalholidays)purportedlyauthorizedbythedetainerformandregulations,andthattheprogramresultedinracialprofilingandnegativelyaffectedcommunitypolicingstrategies.
See,e.
g.
,id.
;WilliamFisher,U.
S.
SheriffAbusedImmigration"Detainer,"LawsuitCharges,InterPressService,Apr.
23,2010,availableathttp://www.
ipsnews.
net/2010/04/us-sheriff-abused-immigration-detainer-lawsuit-charges/.
84See,e.
g.
,PatriciaMazzei,Miami-DadePlanstoStopPayingforFederalImmigrationDetentions,MiamiHerald,Dec.
18,2013,availableathttp://www.
miamiherald.
com/2013/12/18/3826317/miami-dade-plans-to-stop-paying.
html(reportingMiami-Dadecounty'sadoptionofapolicyofhonoringdetainersonlyfor"dangerouscriminalsandrepeatimmigration-lawbreakers");CaliforniaAssemblyBillNo.
4,enactedOct.
5,2013,availableat(continued.
.
.
)StateandLocal"Sanctuary"PoliciesLimitingParticipationinImmigrationEnforcementCongressionalResearchService15cases,however,themeasureappearstosweepmorebroadly,forexample,barringofficialsfromhonoringimmigrationdetainersabsenta"writtenagreementwiththefederalgovernmentbywhichallcostsincurredby[thejurisdiction]incomplyingwiththeICEdetainershallbereimbursed.
"85Thedetainerpolicymayalsorestrictotheraspectsofthejurisdiction'sresponsetofederaleffortstoidentifyand/orobtaincustodyofaliensforpurposesofremoval.
86Althoughcriticizedbysomeforimpedingfederalimmigrationenforcementefforts,87stateorlocalpoliciesofdecliningtohonoratleastsomeimmigrationdetainerswouldappeartobepermissibleunderfederallaw.
NothingintheINApurportstorequirethatstatesandlocalitieshonorimmigrationdetainers.
88Thedetainerregulationsdouselanguagethatsomehaveopinedmeansthatholdspursuanttodetainers,atleast,arerequired,89statingthat"[u]ponadeterminationby[ICE]toissueadetainerforanaliennototherwisedetainedbyacriminaljusticeagency,suchagencyshallmaintaincustodyofthealienforaperiod[generally]nottoexceed48(.
.
.
continued)http://www.
leginfo.
ca.
gov/pub/13-14/bill/asm/ab_0001-0050/ab_4_bill_20131005_chaptered.
pdf(permittinglawenforcementofficerstohonorimmigrationdetainersonlyincertaincircumstances(e.
g.
,theindividualhasbeenconvictedofa"seriousorviolentfelony");ConnecticutAdoptsLawtoLimitImmigrationDetainers,NEWHAVENREGISTERNEWS,June6,2013,availableathttp://www.
nhregister.
com/general-news/20130626/connecticut-adopts-law-to-limit-immigrant-detainers-2(honoringdetainersonlyfor"immigrantswhohavefelonyconvictions,belongtogangs,showuponterroristwatchlists,aresubjecttodeportationordersormeetothersafetyrisks").
85PolicyforRespondingtoICEDetainers,Sept.
7,2011,availableathttp://cookcountygov.
com/ll_lib_pub_cook/cook_ordinance.
aspxWindow/Args=1501(amending§46-37oftheCookCounty,Illinois,Code).
86CookCounty,Illinois,forexample,includesinitsdetainerpolicyaprohibitionuponcountypersonnel"expend[ing]theirtimerespondingtoICEinquiriesorcommunicatingwithICEregardingindividuals'incarcerationstatusorreleasedatewhileonduty.
"Id.
Thisprohibitionappearsintendedtoavoidsituationswhereinimmigrationofficialslearnofanalien'supcomingreleaseandarepresentoutsidethecountyfacilitytotakehimorherintocustody.
Theprohibitionseemstohavebeendraftedasitwas—i.
e.
,restrictingthesharingofinformationabout"incarcerationstatusorreleasedatewhileonduty"—inordertoavoidconflictswith§434ofPRWORAand§642ofIIRIRA,bothofwhichexpresslyprohibitstatesandlocalitiesfromenactingmeasuresthatwouldlimittheabilityofstateandlocalgovernmentsorofficialstoshareinformationregarding"immigrationorcitizenshipstatus"withfederalofficials.
InsofarasCookCounty'sdetainerpolicyrestrictsonlythesharingofinformationaboutaliens'incarcerationstatusorreleasedatewhileofficersareonduty,anargumentcouldbemadethatitdoesnotrunafoulofPRWORAandIIRIRAbecauseitdoesnotabsolutelybarsharingofinformationaboutimmigrationorcitizenshipstatus.
However,in2012theDirectorofICEclaimedthattheCookCountryrestrictionandrelatedmeasurescouldbeimpermissiblebecausetheyprohibitlocalofficialsfromrespondingtoICEinquiries.
SeeLetterfromU.
S.
ICEDirectorJohnMortontoCookCountyPresidentToniPreckwinkle,Jan.
4,2012,availableathttp://legacy.
cookcountygov.
com/secretary/committees/LegislationIntergov/FY2012/reports/legis02-09-12%20%28incl.
%20attachments%29.
pdf#page=39.
87See,e.
g.
,JudicialWatch(JW),PressRelease,JWFilesLawsuitAgainstCookCounty,Ill.
SheriffforRefusaltoHonorICEImmigrationDetainers,Apr.
22,2013,availableathttp://www.
judicialwatch.
org/press-room/press-releases/judicial-watch-files-lawsuit-against-cook-county-ill-sheriff-for-refusal-to-honor-ice-immigration-detainers/.